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Abstract
The Reliable Broadcast concept allows an honest party to send a message to all other
parties and to make sure that all honest parties receive this message. In addition, it allows an
honest party that received a message to know that all other honest parties would also receive
the same message. This technique is important to ensure distributed consistency when facing
failures.
In the current paper, we study the ability to use Reliable Broadcast to consistently transmit
a sequence of input values in an asynchronous environment with a designated sender. The
task can be easily achieved using counters, but cannot be achieved with a bounded memory
facing failures. We weaken the problem and ask whether the receivers can at least share
a common suffix. We prove that in a standard (lossless) asynchronous system no bounded
memory protocol can guarantee a common suffix at all receivers for every input sequence if a
single party might crash.
We further study the problem facing transient faults and prove that when limiting the problem
to transmitting a stream of a single value being sent repeatedly we show a bounded memory
self-stabilizing protocol that can ensure a common suffix even in the presence of transient faults
and an arbitrary number of crash faults. We further prove that this last problem is not solvable
in the presence of a single Byzantine fault. Thus, this problem separates Byzantine behavior
from crash faults in an asynchronous environment.
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Security Research Center in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. This work
was supported in part by The Israeli Centers of Research Excellence (I-CORE) program, (Center No. 4/11).
ar
X
iv
:1
61
1.
05
16
1v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
6 N
ov
 20
16
1 Introduction
Many distributed algorithms make use of the ‘Reliable Broadcast’ technique that allows one party
to send a message to all other parties guaranteeing that if any honest party receives a message,
all honest parties will receive the same message. Reliable Broadcast is somewhat weaker than
Consensus since it allows for more flexibility in dealing with a faulty sender - if the sender is faulty
there is no requirement that any message will ever be received by honest parties. Therefore,
Reliable Broadcast is solvable in an asynchronous environment despite of crash faults.
The current paper studies more deeply the ability to achieve Reliable Broadcast in a ‘Bounded
Model’, in which the memory of honest parties is bounded by some constant, and the system is
asynchronous. For a single message transmission, Reliable Broadcast is achievable with bounded
memory in such a system. For transmitting a sequence of inbound messages via Reliable Broad-
cast we prove the impossibility of even guaranteeing the delivery of only a common suffix of the
sequence of inputs, for some sequences of inputs, given that a single party might crash.
We study two variants of the Bounded Model. In the first variant, in addition to having a
bounded memory, the capacity of each link is also bounded, i.e., there is a constant c¯ such that
the number of messages simultaneously present over each link never exceeds c¯. In the second
variant, in addition to having a bounded memory, the links are unbounded and lossless (the stan-
dard asynchronous environment). In both models there is no assumption about message ordering
over the links, thus, no FIFO is assumed.1 We show a common suffix impossibility results for both
models.
We also study the problem in a system that is subjected to transient faults. For the self-
stabilization model, we prove that a common suffix can be guaranteed for a stream of a single
input value that repeats itself, even when facing any number of crash faults. The solution makes
use of a link layer, inspired by [8, 10]. Our link layer (as we will explain later) guarantees that the
number of ghost messages (messages that weren’t really sent) that might be received, following
the last transient fault, is at most 3. The solution does not exchange acknowledge messages. The
lower bound technique we developed for proving the previous lower bounds is extended to prove
that a common suffix cannot be guaranteed even for a stream of a single value in the presence
of a single Byzantine party. Thus, this problem shows a clear separation between crash and
Byzantine faults.
It is important to point out that the the problem discussed in this article is not equivalent to Total
Ordering Reliable Broadcast. In this paper we consider a single sender in opposed to total ordering
that considers multiple senders and tries to achieve a total order among all concurrent sending
of messages. In addition the impossibility results of this paper are not derived from the FLP
impossibility ([15]), since the single sender message sequence is solvable with infinite memory.
We are not the first to notice that sequential (repeated) Reliable Broadcast is unsolvable under
the bounded model. [20, 5] also show relevant impossibility result, though the model assumes
message loss. Here we show that message loss is not the source of the impossibility result and
the same impossibility result can be achieved without assuming messages loss. In addition the
impossibility result in previous papers is based on the observation that a party cannot generate a
message that has been lost from the internal memory of every party. But this does not necessarily
1If FIFO is assumed, the problem is trivially solvable for the unbounded link capacity variant. The lower bound for
the bounded link capacity variant can be proved for FIFO links as well.
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imply that the sequences received by different parties differ. For example, if the input sequence is
periodic, a party that lost a message may still receive the same sequence, or the same suffix, it
only needs to identify when the period starts. Moreover, the requirement that the input sequence
will be generated by an external entity is not enough, the external entity may enter the same input
to each party, so it is trivial to guarantee an identical sequence of received messages. [16] also
mentioned that the repeated Reliable Broadcast problem is unsolvable when considering finite
memory at each party.
There are many distributed problems that make use of Reliable Broadcast, Tal Rabin and Ran
Canetti used a version of Reliable Broadcast in their paper Fast Asynchronous Byzantine Agree-
ment with Optimal Resilience [3]. They called this version of Reliable Broadcast A-CAST protocol.
They use this protocol to achieve an asynchronous secret sharing which leads to asynchronous
Byzantine agreement.
In [18] a weaker version of Reliable Broadcast is used to replace digital signatures. In that ver-
sion, there is a specific receiver that needs to be able to know that enough other parties received
the sent messages. In [1] a version of repeated Reliable Broadcast is used to achieve approxi-
mate agreement with optimal resilience. In both articles, the repeated Reliable Broadcast protocol
makes use of round numbers in the messages. This technique will clearly not hold in the bounded
model. Can a bounded time stamp technique ([6, 7, 13]) be used to overcome this limitation?
We concentrate on the bounded memory and bounded links model when considering self-
stabilization, since [11, 17] proved that when considering unbounded links, the construction of
self-stabilizing links requires an unbounded memory.
In [2, 9, 12] the practically self-stabilize concept is introduced. A practically stabilizing protocol
assumes that most protocols such as Paxos, under realistic operation have a lifetime that could not
lead their counter to exceed a very high maximal value, e.g., of 264. This can only take place in the
case where a transient fault occurs. Thus, a practically infinite run is a run that lasts a long enough
number of successive steps, i.e., , 264 steps. A practically self-stabilize protocol needs to achieve
this exact behavior and be able to reach the long enough run from any initial configuration. In the
current paper, we consider the classical (strong) self-stabilization and require that the stabilized
run will last forever.
2 The Model and Problem Definition
Let Π = [p1, ..., pn] be a set of parties and let psender be a special party called the sender. An
honest party follows the protocol’s instructions, a crashed party follows the protocol’s instructions
until it crashes, and an adversary controls all Byzantine parties and instructs them what to do,
regardless of the protocol’s instructions. Parties communicate via message passing. There is a
finite set of possible messages that may be sent, thus one cannot use infinite counters, or damp all
past history in a message. We assume a standard asynchronous environment with fully connected
network graph, i.e., there are two directional links between any two parties. Pending messages
over an incoming link may arrive at arbitrary order. psender has an external input stream containing
values that the sender needs to broadcast to all receivers. The values are generated by an external
source and this external source is not subjected to transient faults.
An Internal State of a party is the values of all internal variables. A Configuration, C, is the
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internal states of all parties. The Network State, N , contains all the links and the sets of messages
in them. The System State is S = (C,N).
A step is a function from one system state to another. A step chooses a party, according to the
party’s current internal state it potentially receives a pending message from one of its incoming
links (if the chosen party is psender, it may read the next value from the input stream). As a
function of the specific message obtained (if any) it performs the instructed task, potentially sends
messages to other parties and returns a new internal state. A step may also contain an action to
deliver (output) some value, in this case, a single output is delivered in a step. Notice that not all
actions can be taken at all system states. A step s is feasible at internal state C and network state
N if s is the next step in C and s can be performed at N , i.e., if the message (or input) received in
s is in an incoming link (or at the top of the input stream) of the party.
When a party sends a message to another party, the message is added to the set of pending
messages over the communication link connecting them. If the link is bounded and exceeds its
maximal capacity, then an arbitrary message (either the new one or a pending one) is lost. When
a party tries to receive a message it arbitrarily receives one of the messages present on one of its
incoming links or none (if no message is being received), and the received message is removed
from the respective link.
A run is a sequence of configurations and steps, [c1, s1, ..., sn−1, cn] (could be infinite). A run
specifies only the sequence of configurations and the steps that are performed. It does not specify
the network states. Once a run is applied to a given network state it implies a sequence (could
be infinite) of System States. A run is feasible at a network state N , if for each i, si is feasible
at (ci, Ni), where Ni is the result of applying the prefix [c1, s1, ..., si−1] to N , and if ci+1 is the
result of applying si on ci. The initial configuration is c1. A partial run is a run that starts at some
intermediate configuration of some run and includes some sequence of consecutive steps of that
run.
Consider two models. The semi-bounded model, in which the memory is bounded and the
links are reliable and unbounded. The fully bounded model, in which the memory is bounded and
the links are unreliable, i.e., messages may get lost and the number of messages in transit over a
link never exceeds some constant c¯. In the case of self-stabilization, as a result of a transient fault,
the link may contain fake messages, The only way this may happened is because of transient
faults. Thus, there can be at most c¯ fake messages that may arrive on that link. To eliminate
adversarial link scheduling, assume that if a message is sent infinitely often it will arrive infinitely
often.
Definition 1 (Suffix). Let a, b be two sequences (could be infinite). We say that a is a suffix of b if
there is a location i in b such that the sub-sequence of b that starts from i is the sequence a.
The traditional Reliable Broadcast problem (cf. [4, 19]) focuses on a message delivery con-
sistency. In the current paper we are interested only in a suffix consistency. The Suffix Reliable
Broadcast (SuRB) problem is to implement a protocol that satisfies: psender sends a sequence of
messages, subjected to:
S1) If an honest party delivers an infinite sequence of messages, every honest party delivers an
infinite sequence of messages and all these sequences share a non-trivial common suffix.
S2) If psender is honest and broadcasts an infinite sequence of messages, all honest parties share
a non-trivial common suffix with the input sequence of psender.
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3 Suffix Reliable Broadcast with Unbounded Lossless Links
We examine first the Suffix Reliable Broadcast in the semi-bounded model, thus links are lossless.
The adversary may prevent a message from reaching its destination for as long as it wants, but
eventually, all messages must reach their destinations. We show impossibility of SuRB, i.e., there
is no protocol that can satisfy SuRB for all input sequences in the standard asynchronous model
in the presence of a single crash fault. The proof technique is used later in the paper to prove the
lower bound results for the transient-fault model.
We assume that parties do not have any prior knowledge regarding the input stream to be
provided to the sender.
Since communication links are unbounded we need a compact representation of the network
state. LetM = {m1, ...,mM} be the set of possible messages, which we assume is bounded. The
total number of links in the system is ¯` = n(n − 1). Define the network matrix, N , to be a matrix
of size M × ¯`, where N [i, j] is the number of mi messages currently in link j. For two network
matrices, N1, N2, N1 ≤ N2 if for each entry i, j, N1[i, j] ≤ N2[i, j]. Thus, the system state can be
represented as (C,N), where C is a configuration and N is a network matrix.
Let R1 = [c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(1)
n ] be a run feasible at state N (1) and R2 = [c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] at N (2).
Let N (1)n = N (1)R1 be the resulting network state of applying R1 on N (1). Assume that c
(1)
n = c
(2)
1
and N (2) ≤ N (1)n . It is possible to concatenate R1 and R2 and receive a new partial run R =
[c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] feasible at state S1 = (c
(1)
1 , N
(1)). This concatenation is possible,
because if a run is feasible from a given network matrix then the same run is also feasible at
any greater or equal network matrix, since all the messages used during the run also exist in any
greater or equal network matrix. Notice that R2 could be infinite only if N
(1)
n = N (2), since all
messages need to eventually be delivered, so we need at some point to deliver messages that
has not been delivered within R2.
The following is the main result of this section. The full proof of this theorem appears in
Section 3.2, and other missing proofs appear in the appendix, Section A.
Theorem 1 (SuRB impossibility with one crash). In the semi-bounded model with potentially a
single crash fault, there is no protocol that satisfies the SuRB properties for all input sequences.
The following discussions are about the main elements of the proof of Theorem 1 for the
semi-bounded model. The similar impossibility result for the fully-bounded model appears in the
Appendix.
3.1 An Infinite Chain Existence
Definition 2 (Partial ordered Sequence). Let SetS = {a1, ..., an} be a partial ordered set of ele-
ments (could be infinite) and let ’≤’ be the binary relation among elements of SetS . A sequence
S = a1, a2... of the elements is called a Partial Ordered Sequence. S is called a Fully Ordered
Sequence (or a Chain) if for every i < j, ai ≤ aj .
Definition 3 (Chain in a Sequence). Let S = a1, a2... be a Partial Ordered Sequence (could be
infinite). Let σ = t1, t2... be an increasing sequence of natural numbers (could be infinite). Let
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S′′ = at1 , at2 ... be a sequence over some of the elements of S. We say that S′′ is a Chain in S if
S′′ is a Fully Ordered Sequence.
Definition 4 ( Antichain in a Sequence). Let S = a1, a2... be a Partial Ordered Sequence (could
be infinite). Let σ = t1, t2... be an increasing sequence of natural numbers (could be infinite). Let
S′′ = at1 , at2 ... be a sequence over some of the elements of S. We say that S′′ is a Antichain in S
if each two elements in S′′ are not comparable.
The new presentation of the network state enables us to talk about properties regarding se-
quences of network states. It is easy to see that a sequence of Network Matrices composes a
partial order sequence. Dilworth’s lemma [14] states that each infinite Partial Order set must con-
tain an infinite chain or an infinite Antichain. Unfortunately, the lemma does not refer to sequences.
In order to use Dilworth’s lemma we must first expand it to sequences:
Lemma 1 (Dilworth’s lemma for sequences (infinite version)). A Partial Ordered Sequence with
infinite number of elements must have an infinite Chain or an infinite Antichain.
A short intuition regarding the proof: Let us assume we have a partial order sequence. It is
always possible to match each element with its corresponding index (its location in the sequence).
This way we define a partial order set. Thanks to Dilworth’s lemma we know that this set must have
a Chain or an Antichain. Let us assume it contains a chain. The elements composing the chain
must also compose a chain in the original sequence. Similar arguments hold for an Antichain.
Looking at an infinite sequence of Network Matrices we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (An infinite Chain Existence). Let S be an infinite sequence of network matrices. S must
contain an infinite Chain.
The main idea is to show that there is no infinite Antichain which directly leads to the inevitable
conclusion (using Lemma 1), that there must be an infinite chain. We used reduction to show that
there is no infinite Antichain. We look at the matrix as a long vector. The case for 1 × 1 vectors
is trivial, since the vectors cells are natural numbers. Assume correctness on n × 1 vectors and
prove for (n+ 1)× 1 vectors. Assume to the contrary that there is an infinite Antichain. Let us look
at the first n cells of this infinite Antichain, by the induction hypothesis those cells do not contain an
infinite Antichain so they must contain an infinite chain. Looking at the element of this chain with
the minimal value in the n+1 cell, call it minelement. The next element in the chain that comes right
after minelement, must be greater or equal than minelement. So we found two elements located in
this infinite Antichain that are comparable. This contradicts the assumption that this is actually an
infinite Antichain.
3.2 SuRB Impossibility
We define the problematic sequence which we use to prove the impossibility result:
Definition 5 (Incremental Sequence of Messages). Mx,`−repeated is a sequence M = x, ..., x that
contain only message x for ` times. Let M = x1, ..., xn, ... be an infinite sequence of messages,
where xk ∈ {0, 1}. We say that M is an Incremental Sequence of messages if for every sub-
sequence Mx,`−repeated that ends at some position i in M there exists `′ > ` and a sub-sequence:
M(1−x),`′−repeated that starts at some position j, where j > i.
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This sequence contains an increasing number of consecutive ones and zeros. This sequence
is problematic because for each sub-sequence of such sequence we can always find a later sub-
sequence such that those two sub-sequences do not share a common divider. Using Lemma 13
(appeared in the Appendix) we conclude that if there is no common divider, by switching these two
subsequences we obtain a new and different sequence.
Now assume that there is a protocol that achieves the SuRB properties. The following lemma
must hold for such a protocol (the full proof is in the appendix, Section A):
Lemma 3. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the SuRB properties even when one party is prone
to crash. Let S = (CS , NS) be a reachable System State. There is a partial run R of PR such
that R starts from CS , feasible at NS and in R there are two honest parties who do not deliver the
same sequence of messages.
To obtain some intuition regarding the proof of the lemma assume that when the protocol
reaches S the sequence given to psender via the input stream is an incremental sequence, inc−seq.
Assume that some party p crashes (or dormant) and takes no steps. There must be a run R that
starts at CS feasible at NS and in R each honest party delivers a suffix of inc− seq. Now wait until
we reach the System State, Sstart, in which each party starts delivering the common suffix (except
p who crashed). Look at the sequence of System States starting right after Sstart. Looking only
at the Network Matrices of this sequence we gain an infinite sequence of Network Matrices. This
infinite sequence must contain an infinite chain ( Lemma 2). Looking at the configuration part of
the infinite chain there must be a configuration that repeats itself infinitely many times (the memory
is bounded so there is a finite number of possible configurations). We obtain an infinite sequence
of System States located atR in which the Network Matrices are increasing and the Configurations
repeat. Call this sequence repeated−seq. Call the first, and the second elements of repeated−seq:
repeated− seq1, and repeated− seq2 and call the partial run that starts at repeated− seq1 and ends
at repeated− seq2: repeated− seq1−2. Now we can take repeated− seq1−2 and repeat it again from
repeated− seq2 (because the Network Matrix is larger and the Configurations are the same). Call
this new run R1. We can also repeat repeated − seq1−2 from any system state in repeated − seq.
Let us choose to repeat it when we reach a System State at which the sequence given to psender
in the partial run that starts at repeated − seq2 does not share a common divider with the input
sequence given to psender during repeated− seq1−2. Call this new run R2. Notice that we build two
runs that start at CS feasible at NS and in both of them the sequences that are given to psender
are different (Lemma 13). In addition both runs are composed of the same partial runs so they
both reach the same System State (we formally prove this in the Appendix). The crashed party p
who starts taking steps at the common configuration cannot distinguish between the two runs and
cannot know which sequence to deliver.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that there is a protocol that satisfies the SuRB properties even when
one party is prone to crash. Let PR be such a protocol. Let Sinit = (Cinit, Ninit) be the initial
System State of PR. By Lemma 3, there is a run R starting from Cinit and feasible at Ninit
such that when applying R on Ninit there are two honest parties, p1 and p2, that do not deliver
the same sequence of messages. If the changes in the delivered sequences between p1 and
p2 is infinite we are done (since there is no common suffix), otherwise look at System State,
S1 = (C1, N1), in which p1 and p2 start delivering the same sequence of messages. Look at system
state S2 = (C2, N2) in which all messages that were present in the link in N1 already reached their
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destination (at some point all messages must reach their destination). We know that S2 is a legal
System State because we have a partial run that starts at the initial configuration, feasible at the
initial Network State and reaches S2. Now applying again Lemma 3 on S2 we receive another
partial run, R1, that starts at the C2, feasible at N2 and contains two honest parties that do not
deliver the same sequence of messages.
We can repeat this argument. If we reach a point in which there are two parties that do not
share a common suffix then we are done, otherwise we actually construct an infinite run in which
there is always a pair of parties that do not deliver the same sequence of messages and all
messages eventually had reached their destinations i.e. this is a legal run in which there is no
common suffix.
4 Self-stabilized SuRB of a Single Repeated Message
Self-stabilization is an important objective that robust systems should satisfy. It gives the system
the ability to overcome transient faults and continue functioning even when the most unexpected
transient fault takes place. A self-stabilized system does not assume any initial system configu-
ration, and a proof of correctness is proving that whatever the initial configuration is, the system
converges to perform the desired behavior. It is assumed, though, that the external source gener-
ating the values given to the sender via the input stream is not subjected to transient faults.
The impossibility results of the previous section clearly hold also for the self-stabilizing case.
Therefore, the question stands on what are the extra assumptions under which the SuRB proper-
ties may hold. It turns out that if the input stream is composed of a single value being repeated
forever SuRB can be satisfied, even when facing transient faults.
In the fully-bounded model we show that when assuming that the input stream is a stream of a
single message repeated forever, one can guarantee a suffix reliable broadcast with any number
of crash faults. But there is no solution in the presence of even a single Byzantine fault, i.e., this
shows a clear separation between Byzantine to crash faults.
We decided to investigate the case of a single repeated message because when considering
self-stabilization the sender needs to repeatedly broadcast the same message. If the sender
does not follow this approach the system may start in a configuration in which each honest party
believes that it already received the broadcasted message, in this case the right message may
never be received by the honest parties.
4.1 Self-stabilized SuRB with Crash Faults
Before describing the protocol we build a link layer abstraction that satisfies some basic properties.
The idea is inspired by [8] and can be expanded to a more complex model as described in [10].
This link layer will allow us to bound the convergence time of the protocol.
Link-Layer Definitions:
1. Lost message: a message m that was sent by party P1 to party P2 is called a ‘Lost Message’
if m was sent by P1 but will never be received by P2.
2. Ghost message; a message m that was sent by party P1 to party P2 is called a ‘Ghost
Message’ if m was received by P2 but was never sent by P1.
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3. Duplicated message: a message m that was sent by party P1 to party P2 is called a ‘Dupli-
cated Message’ if m was sent by P1 and arrived to P2 more than once.
4. Reorder Messages: messages m1 and m2 that were sent by party P1 to party P2 are called
‘Reordered Messages’ if m1 was sent by P1 before m2 but P2 received m2 before m1.
Definition 6 ((α, β, γ, λ)-Stabilizing Data-Link). We call a communication abstraction between two
parties P1 and P2, where P1 is the sender and P2 is the receiver, an (α, β, γ, λ)-Stabilizing Data-
Link if the following condition holds:
1. If P1 is honest- the sending operation eventually terminates.
2. If P1 and P2 are honest then:
(a) Only the first α messages after the last transient fault may be lost.
(b) Only the first β messages after the last transient fault may be duplicated.
(c) Only the first γ messages after the last transient fault may be ghost.
(d) Only the first λ messages after the last transient fault may be reordered.
3. If P1 and P2 are honest and P1 sends m infinitely many times in a row then P2 will deliver m
infinitely many times.
We show a protocol that provides an (∞, 0, 3, 0)-Stabilizing Data-Link, The protocol ensures
that at most three ghost messages will be received following a transient fault. The main idea in the
protocol is that a message that has been received c¯+ 1 times cannot be a ghost message (since
there can only be c¯ ghost messages in a link following a transient fault). So if the receiver receives
a message c¯+1 times it delivers this message. To enable the receiver to receive the sent message
c¯ + 1 times the sender sends each message c¯ + 1 times. Notice that we do not claim to achieve
any reliability at this layer, therefore, no ACK messages are used. An infinite number of messages
may still get lost. One last observation that we need to mention is that in [8] it has been proven
that there is no protocol that can guarantee zero duplicated messages. Here we claim to achieve
such a protocol (with zero duplicated messages). The impossibility result obtains in [8] assuming
the duplication occur because of a ghost message. Here we simply count these messages as
ghost messages and not as duplicate messages. It is simply a matter of interpretation that does
not affect the protocol.
The Link Layer Protocol:
Algorithm 1: The Link-Layer sender pseudocode
Function Send(msg)
For i = 0 to c¯ + 1 do /* c¯ is the link capacity */
Send msg;
End.
Algorithm 1 is the link-layer sender algorithm. The sender simply sends the given message c¯+1
times and returns. Algorithm 2 is the link-layer receiver Algorithm. The algorithm maintains two
variables: LastMessage is the last message the receiver received from the sender, and Counter
that counts the number of times the receiver received LastMessage. When receiving a message
from the sender the receiver checks whether the new message is the same as LastMessage, if so
it increases the Counter by one and if the Counter reaches c¯+1 it delivers the message, otherwise
it sets LastMessage to be the new message and resets the Counter to 1.
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Algorithm 2: The Link-Layer receiver pseudocode
Data LastMessage, Counter;
On Receiving msg;
if msg = LastMessage then
Counter + +;
if Counter ≥ c¯ + 1 then /* c¯ the link capacity */
deliver msg;
LastMessage := null;
Counter := 0;
else LastMessage := msg;
Counter := 1;
End.
Theorem 2. In the fully bounded model, where the bound on any link capacity is c¯, the Link Layer
protocol (Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2) satisfies the (∞, 0, 3, 0)-Stabilizing Data-Link specifications.
Proof.
Claim 1 (Link Layer Claim 1 - Sending termination (condition 1)). If P1 is honest then the sending
function eventually terminates.
The send function is sending the given message c¯+ 1 times. So eventually it terminates.
Claim 2 (Link Layer Claim 2 - Non-triviality (condition 3)). If P1 and P2 are honest and P1 sends m
infinitely many times in a row then P2 will deliver m infinitely many times.
From the link properties we know that if P1 sends m infinitely many times in a row then P2 will
receive m infinitely many times. Which means that P2 will see m c¯+1 times in a row infinitely many
times and will deliver m infinitely many times.
Claim 3 (Link Layer Claim 3 - No duplication (condition 2.b)). Let P1 and P2 be two honest parties.
Assume P1 sends m to P2 k times. P2 will deliver m no more than k times (unless m was delivered
by P2 as a ghost message but this can happen no more than 4 times as we will see later).
If P1 sendsm to P2 k times then the message is actually being sentm (c¯+1)k times. P2 delivers
m when it sees it c¯ + 1 times in a row. The communication layer does not duplicate messages so
P2 will receive m no more than (c¯+ 1)k times and will deliver m no more than k times.
Claim 4 (Link Layer Claim 4 - No reordering (condition 2.d)). Let P1 and P2 be two honest parties
and let m1 and m2 be messages sent by P1 to P2. If P1 sends m1 before m2 then P2 will not deliver
m2 before m1.
Assume that P1 sends m2 after it sends m1. Once P1 starts sending m2, it stops sending m1
so when P1 starts sending m2 there is at most c¯ m1 messages that may arrive to P2 after m2. So
when m2 first arrives to P2 there is not enough messages left in the communication link for m1 to
be delivered by P2. So if m1 was delivered by P2 it must be before m2 is delivered.
Claim 5 (Link Layer Claim 5 - At most three ghost messages (condition 2.c)). Let P1 and P2 be
two honest parties and let mi(i = 1, ..., 4) be four messages delivered after the last transient fault
by P2 (in this order), then m4 must be a real message that was sent by P1.
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First Ghost Message: Because of the transient fault P2 can start believing that it has to deliver
m1, so m1 may be fake.
Second Ghost Message: Because of transient fault P2 can start the run when its LastMessage
are set to m2 and its counter is set to 1 (or higher). Also there could be c¯ m2 messages in the
communication link. So m2 may also be fake.
Third Ghost Message: Because of the transient fault P1 can start the run inside the loop of
the send function believing it is sending m3 and so m3 may be received by P2. So the third mes-
sage may also be fake.
The Fourth message cannot be Fake: Assume m4 is also fake. That means that P1 did not send
m4. m4 must be in the system somehow before it was received by P2. It is not in the LastMessage
variable of P2 (because it was caught by m3). So m4 must arrive from the communication link but
in this case there are at most c¯ m4 messages that may arrive so m4 cannot be delivered by P2.
And so m4 cannot be a fake message.
The self-stabilized SuRB Protocol:
Algorithm 3: psender pseudo-code, SuRB broadcast
While true do
Input Message
Send Message to all parties using the Link-Layer;
End.
Algorithm 4: pi pseudo-code
On Receiving from the Link-Layer msg from psender:
SuRB deliver(msg).
Theorem 3. When assuming an input stream of a single message repeated forever the self-
stabilized SuRB protocol (Algorithm 3, Algorithm 4) satisfies the SuRB properties for any number
of crash fault.
Proof. We first prove the S2 property of SuRB: If the sender is honest and the input stream con-
tains a single message m repeated forever, then each honest party must have a suffix of delivered
messages that contains only m. By the link layer properties, we know that at most three mes-
sages could be ghost messages. So from the fourth message on, all the messages delivered by
each honest party must be real. psender is honest so he sends m infinitely many times. The link
layer properties imply that eventually each honest party will receive m and only m, which means
that eventually each honest party will deliver m and only m. In addition, after each honest party
delivered three messages, at the latest, we can be sure that all following messages that will be
delivered by every honest party will be m and only m.
We now prove the S1 property. If psender is honest, from S2 we conclude that eventually each
honest party will deliver only the message that has been given to the sender via the input stream
and so all honest parties will share a common suffix.
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If psender is has crashed (dishonest) then eventually each honest party will stop receiving mes-
sages from psender and will stop delivering messages. This means that there is no party that
delivers an infinite number of messages and so condition S1 clearly holds, since it considers only
the case in which there is an honest party delivering an infinite number of messages.
4.2 Self-Stabilize SuRB Impossibility When Facing a Byzantine Party
In this section we will prove that even when the input stream given to the sender is a stream of
a single message repeated forever, it is impossible to achieve the SuRB propertiesł assuming
transient faults and a single Byzantine party. The SuRB impossibility proof (Theorem 1) does not
directly apply here, since we do not consider all possible inputs, but rather a stream of a single
message. We introduce few changes to the definitions we used in the SuRB impossibility proof.
Self-stabilization does not require an initial System State and therefore any System State may be
the initial System State. Also we need to consider the possibility of transient faults and the mali-
ciousness of one party so now a run may contain the possibility to move from one configuration
to another without applying any step. The only way such things may happen is because of tran-
sient faults, which cause parties to change their internal states, or because of maliciousness of
one party, which also causes it to change its internal state. All the missing proofs appear in the
appendix, Section B.1.
Self-Stabilization obligates us to continuously keep delivering messages. If at some point the
protocol stops delivering messages then it could be that the run would start at this point and no
messages will ever be delivered and there is no way that any party will share a common suffix with
the input stream. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Assume that the input stream given to psender is a steam of a single message repeated
forever. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the conditions of the SuRB problem and is resistant
to one malicious party. Let S = (C,N) be an arbitrary System State. For each party p′ ∈ P ,
p′ 6= psender, there is always a run R that starts from C and is feasible at N such that p′ takes no
steps in R and each honest party delivers an infinite number of messages.
A transient fault may cause parties to change their internal state illegally, which will cause the
System State to change without any step taken. In addition, a Byzantine party is also able to
change its internal state illegally, which will also cause the System State to change without any
step taken. These observations imply the following lemma:
Lemma 5 (Concatenation of runs using a transient fault or a Byzantine sender). Assume that
the input stream given to psender is a steam of a single message repeated forever. Let PR be
a protocol that satisfies the conditions of a SuRB problem and resistant to one Byzantine party.
Let R1 = [c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(1)
n ] and R2 = [c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] be two runs such that c
(1)
n and c
(2)
1 are
different only in the internal state of psender. Let N1 be a network state such that R1 is feasible at
N1 and let N2 be the resulting network state of applying R1 on N1. Assume that R2 is feasible
at N2. If psender is Byzantine or a transient fault causes the last configuration of R1 to be the
same as the first configuration of R2, then we can concatenate R1 and R2 and receive a new run
R = [c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(1)
n , c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] feasible at N1.
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 allow us to concatenate an infinite number of runs together and create
a run in which each honest party delivers an incremental sequence.
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Lemma 6. Assume that the input stream given to psender is a steam of a single message repeated
forever. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the conditions of the SuRB problem and resistant to
one Byzantine party. For each party p′ ∈ P , p′ 6= psender, and for each System State S = (C,N)
there is a run R that starts from C and is feasible at N such that p′ takes no steps in R and each
honest party delivers an infinite incremental sequence. Also, the only party that might change its
internal state illegally in R (because of transient fault or maliciousness) is psender.
In the proof of Lemma 6 we build a run Rfinal that causes every honest party (other that p′) to
deliver an incremental sequence by concatenating an infinite number of runs together. The basic
idea is that we can let psender sends some message, say m0, repeatedly, until (using condition
S2) every honest party delivers that message. Then, using a transient fault, cause psender to start
sending a different message, say m1, until every honest party delivers a longer suffix of m1 than it
delivered m0 before. Now we can switch back to m0 to deliver even a longer suffix. Because in all
those runs p′ takes no steps it means that p′ takes no steps in Rfinal. So p′ clearly assumed to be
failed (or Byzantine), since an honest party must start, at some point, taking steps.
The only way we could concatenate those runs is by using transient faults that occasionally
change the internal state of the sender. This means that Rfinal contains an infinite number of
transient faults. But it should not concern us since in the proof below we use Rfinal only to
construct an adversarial behavior of a Byzantine sender, and we wake up the sleeping party p′.
Theorem 4 (SuRB impossibility assuming a transient fault and a single Byzantine party). Assum-
ing that the input stream is a stream of a single messages repeated forever. In an asynchronous
system and fully bounded model, there is no self-stabilizing protocol that solves the SuRB problem
in the presence of a single Byzantine party.
Proof outline: Let p′ (p′ 6= psender) be a party in P and let S = (C,N) be an arbitrary system state.
By Lemma 6 we know that there is a run R that starts in C and is feasible at N such that p′ takes
no steps in R and each honest party delivers an infinite incremental sequence of messages.
Let’s look at the sequence Sseq = S1, ..., Sn, ... of System States we receive by applying R on
N . Let Sseq1 be a sequence of System States from Sseq such that the next step that follows each of
the System States of Sseq1 is that psender reads an input from the input queue. The memory of each
party is bounded and the network links are also bounded so there must be a System State that
repeats itself infinitely many times during Sseq1 , let’s call this System State Sinf and let Sinf−seq be
the sequence of Sinf ’s in Sseq. Notice that all the configurations in Sinf−seq are the same and the
network states are also the same. Let seq be the sequence of input values used in the construction
of the run R in the proof of Lemma 6.
Now we can continue the same way as Lemma 3 and Theorem 1 (SuRB impossibility in the
fully-bounded model) and prove that there is a run Rfinal in which there is no common suffix. The
only problem is that we compose Rfinal from R and in R there is an infinite number of transient
faults, which means that Rfinal does not necessarily contain a common suffix. Looking at the
proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorem 1 we will notice that during the proof we woke up the sleepy
party, which means that now we can assume that the “illegal” changes in the internal state of
psender is because of maliciousness and not because of transient faults, i.e., the Byzantine sender
invents these values (seq) whenever a value needs to be read to produce R. Now Rfinal contains
no transient faults, which means that it must contain a common suffix but it actually doesn’t.
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5 Discussion of the Impossibility Results
The SuRB impossibility shows that self-stabilization has serious limitations even in the fully bounded
model. It surfaces the main difference between Byzantine behavior and weaker fault models. It
shows that there is no general technique that can take a Byzantine tolerant distributed protocol and
stabilize it. Asynchrony, Byzantine and self-stabilization are necessary to prove the impossibility
result and without any one of them the problem is solvable.
The SuRB problem does not require honest parties to deliver an infinite sequence of messages
if the sender is faulty. Hypothetically, someone may find a protocol that satisfies the conditions and
stop delivering messages at some point. The self-stabilizing SuRB impossibility result shows that
no such protocol exists. Notice that the requirement that each honest party will deliver an infinite
sequence of messages does not come from the problem definition but from the system model.
This is why the self-stabilizing SuRB impossibility result is more surprising than the impossibility
result of the repeated Reliable Broadcast. In the Reliable Broadcast problem we can intuitively
understand that we cannot save the delivered sequence forever, while in the self-stabilized SuRB
problem with transient faults we only have to agree on one message. Our proof shows that we
cannot agree on a single message when we consider asynchrony, self-stabilization, and Byzantine
concurrently.
In [2], a “practically” self-stabilizing Paxos with crashed faults is introduced. It looks like this
result contradicts the impossibility result of the SuRB problem. Our result actually reinforces the
protocol presented in [2]. [2] doesn’t solve a regular self-stabilization, but rather requires stabilized
run to last only long enough for any concrete system’s time-scale. A run is divided into epochs.
Each epoch is a stabilized run. When an epoch terminates, the history is cleared and a “blank”
history is started.
In this article we showed that when considering the case in which the sender sends a single
repeated message the SuRB problem is solvable considering transient and crash faults. Also we
showed that the problem is not solvable considering all possible input sequences. It is interesting
to understand what are the minimal assumptions about the input sequence in which the problem
is solvable. We leave it open to draw the line that will turn the problem to be solvable.
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Appendix
A SuRB Impossibilities
A.1 SuRB Impossibility with Unbounded Lossless links
Lemma 7. Let R be a run and let S1 = (c,N1), S2 = (c,N2) be two System State such that R is
feasible at S1 and at S2. Assume that after applying R on S1 we reach System State S′1 = (c′1, N ′1)
and after applying R on S2 we reach System State S′2 = (c′2, N ′2). Assume that for some i, j,
N1[i, j] = k1 and N ′1[i, j] = k1 + t1 (the i, j location of N1 changes by t1 after applying R on S1, t1
can be negative). Assume that N2[i, j] = k2 and N ′2[i, j] = k2 + t2 (the i, j location of N2 changes
by t2 after applying R on S2, t2 can be negative). It must be that t1 = t2.
Proof. The run R added and removed the same number of message mi from link j so after ap-
plying it on S2 and on S1 the difference of the number of mi messages on link j must be the
same.
Lemma 8. Let N be some network state. Let R be a partial run. Assume that R is feasible at N
and let N1 = NR. Assume that N ≤ N1. R is feasible at N1 and N2 = N1R satisfies N1 ≤ N2.
Proof. Since N ≤ N1 it is clear that R is feasible at N1. All that is left to show is that N1 ≤ N2. For
each i, j there is a k ≥ 0 such that after applying R on N the (i, j) cell of N changes by k (k is
greater than or equal to zero because N ≤ N1). So we conclude that N1[i, j] = N [i, j] + k. Now
when applying R on N1, by Lemma 7 the (i, j) cell of N1 changes by k, so N2[i, j] = N1[i, j] + k.
And this is true for each valid (i, j) so it must be that N1 ≤ N2.
Lemma 9. Let S be a Set of network matrices along with the binary relation ’≤’ as defined above.
S is a partial ordered set.
Proof. In order to show that S is a partial order set we need to prove three properties: reflexivity,
antisymmetry, transitivity.
Reflexivity: let a be a network matrix. It is clear that each cell in a is less than or equal to itself
and so a ≤ a.
Antisymmetry: let a, b be two network matrices. Assume that a ≤ b and b ≤ a. It is clear the
a[i, j] ≤ b[i, j] and b[i, j] ≤ a[i, j] for each valid i and j (i and j that do not exceed the matrix size).
So it is clear that for each such i and j, it holds that a[i, j] = b[i, j] so it is clear that a = b.
Transitivity: let a, b, c be three network matrices such that a ≤ b and b ≤ c. It is clear the
a[i, j] ≤ b[i, j] and b[i, j] ≤ a[i, j] for each valid i and j (i and j that do not exceed the the matrix
size). So it is clear that for each such i and j, it holds that a[i, j] ≤ c[i, j] and so a ≤ c.
Lemma 10 (Dilworth’s lemma (infinite version [14] section 3.5)). A partial order set with infinite
number of elements must have an infinite Chain or an infinite Antichain.
Lemma 1. [repeated - Dilworth’s lemma for sequences (infinite version)] A Partial Ordered Se-
quence with infinite number of elements must have an infinite Chain or an infinite Antichain.
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Proof. Let S be an infinite Partial Ordered Sequence with the binary relation ‘≤’. We will build a set
S′ of tuples (n, a) in the following way: for each i > 0 let a be the i-th element in S. Add to S′ the
element (i, a). We define the binary relation ‘≤’ on S′ in the following way: let a = (i, a′), b = (j, b′)
be two elements in S′, a ≤ b iff i ≤ j and a′ ≤ b′. First we will show that S′ along with the binary
relation ‘≤’ is a partial order set.
Reflexivity: let a = (i, a′) be an element in S′. It is clear that i ≤ i and since S is a partial order
it is also clear that a′ ≤ a′ so it is clear that a ≤ a.
Antisymmetry: let a = (i, a′), b = (j, b′) be two elements in S′. Assume that a ≤ b and b ≤ a.
So it is clear that i ≤ j and j ≤ i so i = j. It is also clear that a′ ≤ b′ and b′ ≤ a′ so a′ = b′. So we
conclude that a = b.
Transitivity: let a = (i, a′), b = (j, b′), c = (t, c′) be three elements in S′. Assume that a ≤ b and
b ≤ c. So it is clear that i ≤ j and j ≤ t so i ≤ t. It is also clear that a′ ≤ b′ and b′ ≤ c′ so a′ ≤ c′.
So we conclude that a ≤ c.
Now by Lemma 10 we get that S′ contains an infinite Chain or an infinite Antichain. Assume
that S′ contains an infinite Chain. Let S′′ = (i1, a1), ..., (il, al), ... be that chain. Let’s order S′′ by
the i-th entry of each tuple and get only the a’s entries. We receive a Chain in S. We can do the
same on an Antichain and receive an Antichain in S.
Lemma 11 (An infinite Antichain Inexistence). Let S be an infinite sequence of network matrices
along with the binary relation ’≤’ as defined above. S does not contain an infinite Antichain.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on the network matrix size. We can map the network
matrices to vectors such that each cell of the network matrix is mapped to a cell on this vector.
Vector a is greater than or equal to vector b iff its corresponding matrix, a′, is greater than or equal
to the corresponding matrix of b.
Assume that S contains an infinite Antichain. This means that there is an infinite sequence of
elements from S such that each two distinct elements in this sequence are incomparable. Call this
sequence S′.
We prove the lemma by induction of the vector length. First, assume that the vector size is 1
(i.e., Network matrix of size 1× 1). Since network matrix entries are non-negative natural number,
it is clear that there is no infinite Antichain, S′.
Now assume correctness for vectors of size n and prove it on vectors of size n+ 1. Assume to
the contrary that such S′ exists. Let’s look first only at the first n cells of all vectors in S′ (the infinite
Antichain). From the inductive hypothesis we know that when considering only those n cells, there
is no infinite Antichain. By Lemma 1, we know that each infinite Partial Ordered Sequence must
contain an infinite Chain or an infinite Antichain. Since looking at the first n cells we do not get
an infinite Antichain, there is an infinite Chain S′′ such that when looking only at the first n cells
of the elements in S′′ we get a totally ordered sequence (remember that S′′ is a sequence of
elements from S′ and S′′ is infinite). Now look at the n + 1-st cell of the elements of S′′. Call the
element with the minimum value in the n+ 1 cell minelement. The element that appears in S′′ right
after minelement must be greater or equal minelement in the n + 1-st cell and in the other n cells.
This way we actually find two comparable elements in S′ which implies that S′ is not an infinite
Antichain.
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Lemma 2. [repeated] Let S be an infinite sequence of network matrices. S must contain an
infinite Chain.
Proof. By Lemma 1 we conclude that S must contain an infinite Chain or an infinite Antichain. By
Lemma 11 we conclude that S does not contain an infinite Antichain, so S must contain an infinite
Chain.
Lemma 12. Let S = (c,N) be some configuration and let R1 and R2 be two partial runs feasible
at S. Assume that the initial and final internal configurations of both R1 and R2 are the same and
equal c. Assume that R2 is feasible at NR1 and R1 is feasible at NR2. Then NR1R2 ≡ NR2R1.
Proof. We assumed that R1 and R2 ended in the same system internal state so NR1R2 and
NR2R1 system internal states are the same and equal c. All that is left to show is that the network
matrices are the same. Let N [i, j] be the value of the i, j cell of N . Let N1 be the resulting network
matrix of applying R1 on C. There is a value k such that N1[i, j] = N [i, j]+k (k could be negative).
Let N2 be the network matrix of N1R2. There exists a value d such that N2[i, j] = N1[i, j] + d =
N [i, j]+k+d (k+d could be negative). Let N3 be the resulting network matrix of applying R2 on C.
By Lemma 7R2 changes the i, j cell ofN by d soN3[i, j] = N [i, j]+d. LetN4 be the network matrix
of N3R1. By Lemma 7 R1 changes the i, j cell of N3 by k so N4[i, j] = N3[i, j] +k = N [i, j] +d+k.
This is true for each valid i, j so N4 = N2.
Definition 7. Let Seq be a sequence of elements and let q be a natural number. qSeq is a sequence
of concatenating Seq to itself q times.
Lemma 13 (The Common Divider Lemma). Let a1 and a2 be two non-empty sequences such
that the size of a2 is greater than the size of a1. Let’s look at two compositions of a1 and a2,
b1 = a1 + a1 + a2 and b2 = a1 + a2 + a1. b1 = b2 iff there exists a sequence S of size less than or
equal the size of a1 and two natural numbers n, r > 0 such that a1 = nS and a2 = rS, we call S
the common divider.
Proof. If a1 = nS and a2 = rS then b1 = a1 +a1 +a2 = (2n+r)S and b2 = a1+a2 +a1 = (2n+r)S
so b1 = b2. Now assume that b1 = b2. Sequences b1 and b2 are the same iff a1 + a2 is the same
as a2 + a1. We will show that for this to happened there must be a sequence, S, and two natural
number n, r such that a1 = nS and a2 = rS. We will use recursion. We first assume that the size
of a1 is 1 and it equals x. If there is no natural number n > 1 such that a2 = nx then there must
be a location, i, in a2 + a1 such that the value in i is not x and the value in i+ 1 is x, in a1 + a2 this
location moves one index foreword, so the value in the location i+1 of a1+a2 and a2+a1 is not the
same and so the sequences are not the same. Let u < v be two numbers. Assume that for each
i, j such that i < u, j < v, i < j and the size of a1 and a2 is i and j respectively, a1 +a2 is the same
as a2 + a1 if there is a sequence, S, and two natural number n, r such that a1 = nS and a2 = rS.
We will prove the same result for a1 of size u and a2 of size v. Let a2[0 : u] be a sub-sequence of a2
that starts at position 0 and ends at position u, it must be that a1 = a2[0 : u]. Now for a1 + a2 to be
the same as a2 + a1, a2[u : 2u] must be the same as a2[0 : u] which equals a1. We can repeatedly
continue until we reach the end of a2, if a1 fits exactly to a2 we are done, otherwise there must be
z < u such that a2[v − z, v] + a1[0, u − z] = a1 (notice that in such case there exists q such that
a2 = qa1 + a2[v− z, v], see figure 1). But we also know that a1[u− z, u] = a2[v− z, v]. So we know
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Figure 1: a1 + a2 is the same as a2 + a1
that there exits z such that a1 = a1[0 : u − z] + a1[u − z : u] = a1[u − z : u] + a1[0 : u − z] but by
induction we know that for this to be true there must be a sequence S and two natural numbers
l, h such that a1[u − z : u] = lS and a1[0 : u − z] = hS. So we conclude that a1 = (l + h)S and
a2 = (q(l + h))S + lS = (q(l + h) + l)S and we are done.
Lemma 14. Let S be an incremental sequence of messages. Let S[i, j] be a sub-sequence of S
that starts at position i and ends at position j. There exists t > j such for each r > t there are
no natural numbers n, k > 0 for which there exists a sequence Seq such that S[i, j] = nSeq and
S[j, r] = kSeq i.e., there is no common divider.
Proof. Let’s look at some i, j such that i < j. Assume that S[i, j] contains only zeros. Since S is
an incremental sequence of messages, there must be a subsequence of S, S′, that contains only
ones and appears in S at position x after j. For each x′ > x there is no natural numbers n, k > 0 for
which there exists a sequence Seq such that S[i, j] = nSeq and S[j, x′] = kSeq. The proof for the
case in which S[i, j] contains only ones is the same. Now if S[i, j] contains also ones and zeros.
Since S is an incremental sequence of messages then there must be a subsequence of S, S′, of
size greater then 2(j− i) that contains only ones and appears in S at position x after j. Let x′ be a
position in S in which S′ already finished. For each x′′ > x′ there is no natural numbers n, k > 0 for
which there exists a sequence Seq such that S[i, j] = nSeq and S[j, x′] = kSeq because S[j, x′′]
contains a subsequence, Ssub, of size greater than 2(j − i) that contains only ones. For Seq to
exists, Ssub must contain it but S[i, j] contains ones and zeros and Ssub contains only ones. So if
Ssub contains Seq it cannot be that S[i, j] also contains it.
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Definition 8 (Legal System State). Let PR be a protocol. Let S be a System State. We say that
S is a legal System State (or reachable system state) if there is a partial run R that starts from the
initial configuration of PR, feasible at the initial network state of PR and ends in S.
Lemma 3. [repeated] Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the SuRB properties even when one
party is prone to crash. Let S = (CS , NS) be a reachable System State. There is a partial run R of
PR such that R starts from CS , feasible at NS and in R there are two honest parties who do not
deliver the same sequence of messages.
Proof. First, we know that there is a run that starts from the initial configuration and reached
S. Assume that when we reach S the input sequence, M , of psender is an infinite incremental
sequence of messages. Let RS be the run that starts at CS , feasible at NS and causes each
party (except one party, p′ 6= psender, that takes no steps in R, crashed) to deliver M . We know
that RS exists because S is legal System State so there must be a run feasible at S satisfying
the SuRB conditions even when one party may crash and the input sequence of psender is M .
Let CRS be a sequence of the System States obtained by applying RS on NS . Let CR be a
sequence of System States from CRS such that the next step that follows each of those System
States is that psender reads a value from the external input queue. CR contains an infinite number
of configurations. We know that the memory of each party is bounded so there must be at least
one configuration that repeats itself infinitely many times during CR, let’s call it Crepeated. Let
CRrepeated be the sequence that contains all System States of CR that their configuration equals
Crepeated. Let’s look at the sequence of network matrices appearing in CRrepeated, by Lemma 2
we know that this sequence contains an infinite Chain. Let CRrepeated−chain be the sequence of
elements from CRrepeated that composes the infinite Chain. CRrepeated−chain is a sequence of the
form (Crepeated, N1), ..., (Crepeated, Nn), ... such that for each i < j, Ni ≤ Nj .
Let Sinf −1 = (Crepeated−1, N1) (i.e., Sinf −1 is the first System State in CRrepeated−chain). Let
x1 be an index of a message m1 that is about to be read by psender after Sinf −1. Let Sinf −2 =
(Crepeated−2, N2) be the second System State in CRrepeated−chain and let x2 be an index of a mes-
sage m2 that is about to be read by psender after Cinf −2. Let x3 be an index of messages in m3
such that the size of M [x1, x2] is less than the size of M [x2, x3]. By Lemma 14, we know that there
is an index x4 such that for each index x5 > x4 the sub-sequences M [x1, x2] and M [x2, x5] do not
share a common divider. Let Sinf −3 = (Crepeated−3, N3) be the System State in CRrepeated−chain in
which psender already received the message in position Max(x3, x4) as input.
Notice that by the construction of CRrepeated−chain the configurations of Sinf −1, Sinf −2, Sinf −3
are the same and the network matrix of Sinf −3 is greater than or equal to the network matrix of
Sinf −2, which is also greater than or equal to the network matrix of Sinf −1.
Let’s now separate R to four runs. The first, R1, starts at CS , feasible at NS and ends in
Crepeated−1. The second, R2, starts at Crepeated−1, feasible at N2 and ends in Crepeated−2, the
third, R3, starts at Crepeated−2, feasible at N2 and ends in Crepeated−3 and the last, R4, starts at
Crepeated−3, feasible at N3 and continues infinitely with some legal run.
By Lemma 8 and the fact that the network matrices are increasing, after reaching Sinf −2 we
can run R2 again, reaching a new System State Sinf −2−1 such that the network matrix of Sinf −2 is
less than or equal to the network matrix of Sinf −2−1. Now we can run R3, reaching a new System
State Sinf −3−1. To sum up we constructed a new partial run R5 = R1 + R2 + R2 + R3 feasible at
NS .
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By Lemma 8 and the fact that the network matrices are increasing, after reaching Sinf −3 we
can run R2 again and reach a new System State Sinf −3−2 such that the network matrix of Sinf −3
is less than or equal to the network matrix of Sinf −3−2. To sum up we construct a new partial run
R6 = R1 +R2 +R3 +R2 feasible at NS .
Let M5, M6 be the sequence of messages delivered by applying R5, R6 on NS respectively. By
Lemma 12 we conclude that both R5 and R6 ends in the same System State after applying them
on NS so Sinf −3−2 = Sinf −3−1. Now if p′ wakes up in Sinf −3−1 (or Sinf −3−2) it cannot distinguish
between R5 and R6. There is a scenario in which p′ delivers M5 while all other parties deliver M6
and there is a scenario in which p′ delivers M6 while all other parties deliver M5. So it is enough
to show that M5 and M6 are different. Let MR2 be the sequence given to psender in R2 and let MR3
be the sequence given to psender in R3. For M5 and M6 to be the same, MR2 + MR2 + MR3 must
be the same as MR2 + MR3 + MR2 (notice that by construction of R2 and R3, the size of MR2 is
less than the size of MR3). By Lemma 13 we know that for MR2 +MR2 +MR3 to be the same as
MR2 +MR3 +MR2 , those two sequences must share a common divider. But we constructed those
two sequences such that this scenario will not happen and so M5 and M6 must be different.
A.2 SuRB Impossibility with Bounded links
The proof of Theorem 1 uses only Lemma 3, therefore in order to prove the impossibility result, it
is enough to show that Lemma 3 holds when links are bounded.
Lemma 15. Let M be an infinite incremental sequence of messages. For each index x1 there are
two sub-sequences of M , M0,`−repeated and M1,t−repeated, such that the first time those sequences
appears in M is after x1.
Proof. Because M is an infinite incremental sequence of messages we can assume that there is
an infinite increasing sequence L = `1, `2, ... such that M0,`−repeated appears in M for each ` ∈ L
and there is an infinite increasing sequence T = t1, t2, ... such that M1,t−repeated appears in M for
each t ∈ T . There is only a finite number of messages that appear before x1 so there is a finite
number of ` ∈ L such that M0,`−repeated starts before x1 and so we can always find ` ∈ L such
that the first time that M0,`−repeated appears in M is after x1. Also there is a finite number of t ∈ T
such that M1,t−repeated starts before x1 and so we can always find t ∈ T such that the first time that
M1,t−repeated appears in M is after x1.
The following lemma is a general claim about sequences. These sequences may not reflect
any possible run. When it is used later we will make sure that the sequences belong to feasible
runs.
Lemma 16. Let M be an infinite sequence of messages. Let M ′ be the same sequence as M
without Msub, then M is different from M ′.
Proof. Let x be the index in M at which Msub ends. We know that there is a sub-sequence of
M , mi,`−repeated, that appears in M for the first time after x (Lemma 15). Let x1 be the index at
which Mi,`−repeated first appears in M . In M ′ we delete the sequence Msub which comes before
Mi,`−repeated and is not empty, so the first timeMi,`−repeated appears inM ′ must be before it appears
in M .
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Figure 2: In R each honest party delivers an infinite incremental sequence of messages
Figure 3: Creating R5 by concatenating R1, R3 and R4
Let x2 be the index in M ′ at which Mi,`−repeated first appears in M ′ (remember that by definition
Mi,`−repeated contains only messages mi). There must be an index x3 such that x2 ≤ x3 ≤ x2 + `
such that the value ofM at x3 is notmi, otherwise, the first time the sequenceMi,`−repeated appears
in M is at x2, where x2 < x1, but we assumed that the first time Mi,`−repeated appears in M is at x1
so we reach a contradiction. So there must be an index x3 such that the value of M in this index
is different from the value of M ′ at this index and so it must be that M is different from M ′.
Lemma 3. [repeated] Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the SuRB properties even when one
party is prone to crash. Let S = (CS , NS) be a reachable System State. There is a partial run R of
PR such that R starts from CS , feasible at NS and in R there are two honest parties who do not
deliver the same sequence of messages.
Proof. First, we know that there is a run that starts from the initial configuration and reached
S. Assuming that when we reach S the input sequence, M , of psender is an infinite incremental
sequence of messages. Let RS be the run that starts at CS , feasible at NS and causes each party
(except one party, p′ 6= psender, that takes no steps in R, crashed) to deliver M . We know that RS
exists because S is legal System State so there must be a run feasible at S satisfying the SuRB
conditions even when one party may crash and the input sequence of psender is M . Let CRS be a
sequence of the System States obtained by applying RS on NS . Let CR be a sequence of System
States from CRS such that the next step that follows each of those System States is that psender
reads a value from the input queue. CR contains an infinite number of system states. We know
that the memory of each party is bounded and so is the links, so there must be at least one system
state that repeats itself infinitely many times during CR, let’s call it Sinf = (Cinf , Ninf).
Let Sinf −1 = (Cinf −1, Ninf −1) be the first time Sinf appears in RS . Let x1 be an index of a
message, m0, in M such that in Sinf −1, psender didn’t already read m0. From Lemma 15 we know
that there exists ` > 0 and a sequence M0,`−repeated in M such that the first time that m0,`−repeated
appears in M is after x1. Let S1 be a system state in RS in which psender already read all the
messages in M0,`−repeated and let Sinf −2 = (Cinf −2, Ninf −2) be the first time Sinf appears in RS
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Figure 4: Cut R and R5 in C2 and receiving R6 and R7
after S1. Let x2 be an index of a message, m1, in M such that in Sinf −2, psender already read m1.
From Lemma 15 we know that there exists t > 0 and a sequence M1,t−repeated in M such that the
first time that M1,t−repeated appears in M is after x2. Let S2 = (C2, N2) be a system state in RS in
which psender already read all the messages in M1,t−repeated (see Figure 2).
Let’s now separate R to four runs. The first, R1, starts at CS , feasible at NS and ends in Cinf −1.
The second, R2, starts at Cinf −1, feasible at N2 and ends in Cinf −2, the third, R3, starts at Cinf −2,
feasible at N2 and ends in C2 and the last, R4, starts at C2, feasible at N3 and continues infinitely
as RS .
Now we can concatenate R1, R3, R4 and receive R5 feasible at NS such that in NSR5, p does
not deliver the sequence of messages that it delivered during R2 which is not empty (see Figure 3).
Now let’s cut R and R5 in configuration C2 and receive two new partial runs such that p′ is
honest and does not take steps until we reach configuration C2. We call those partial runs R6 and
R7, respectively (see Figure 4).
Let M5, M6 be the sequence of messages that p delivers in NSR5, NSR, respectively. Let
MR2 be the sequence of messages that p delivers during R2. Now if p
′ wakes up in S2 it cannot
distinguish between R5 and R. There is a scenario in which p′ delivers M5 while all other parties
deliver M6 and there is a scenario in which p′ delivers M6 while all other parties deliver M5. So it is
enough to show that M5 and M6 are different. From Lemma 16 we know that those to sequences
must be different so we are done.
B Self-Stabilize Reliable Broadcast
B.1 Self-Stabilize SuRB Impossibility with a Single Byzantine Party
Lemma 17. Assume that the input stream given to psender is a stream of a single message re-
peated forever. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the conditions of the SuRB problem and is
resistant to one Byzantine party. Let S = (C,N) be an arbitrary System State. For each party
p′ ∈ P , p′ 6= psender, there is a run R that starts at C and is feasible at N such that p′ takes no
steps and each honest party delivers a new message.
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Proof. Assume that p′ is Byzantine and takes no steps at all. PR is tolerant to one Byzantine
party so it must satisfy the SuRB conditions even when p′ takes no steps (p′ might be Byzantine).
Assume that there exists a System State S = (C,N) such that for each run R that starts at C and
is feasible at N there is a party p that does not deliver a new message. This contradicts condition 2
of SuRB, because each honest party must have a suffix of delivered messages that contains only
the input of psender, the run may start at S and so p will not deliver any messages at all in particular
p will not deliver the message sent by psender. So from any System State S there is always a run
R such that p′ takes no steps in R and each honest party delivers a new message.
Lemma 4. [repeated] Assume that the input stream given to psender is a steam of a single mes-
sage repeated forever. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the conditions of the SuRB problem and
is resistant to one malicious party. Let S = (C,N) be an arbitrary System State. For each party
p′ ∈ P , p′ 6= psender, there is always a run R that starts from C and is feasible at N such that p′
takes no steps in R and each honest party delivers an infinite number of messages.
Proof. This is a direct result of Lemma 17. Let S = (C,N) be an arbitrary System State. We
know that there is a run R1 that starts at C and is feasible at N which causes each honest party
to deliver a new message and p′ takes no steps in R1. Let CR1 be the configuration in R1 in which
each honest party already delivered a new message and let NR1 be the corresponding network
state. Again from Lemma 17 we know that there is a run R2 that starts in CR1 and is feasible atNR1
which causes each honest party to deliver a new message and p′ takes no steps in R2. Let CR2 be
the configuration in R2 in which each honest party already delivered a new message and let NR2
be the corresponding network state. We can now repeat the same arguments over and over again
and receive R3, ..., Rn, .... So we have an infinite sequence of runs such that each honest party
delivers at least one new message in each run and each run starts with the same configuration
in which the last run ended. In addition for each i the network state reached by applying Ri on
Ni is Ni+1. We can now concatenate all these runs and receive a new run that starts at C and is
feasible at N in which each honest party delivers an infinite number of messages and p′ takes no
steps in it.
Lemma 5. [repeated] Assume that the input stream given to psender is a steam of a single mes-
sage repeated forever. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the conditions of a SuRB problem and
resistant to one Byzantine party. Let R1 = [c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(1)
n ] and R2 = [c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] be two
runs such that c(1)n and c
(2)
1 are different only in the internal state of psender. Let N1 be a network
state such that R1 is feasible at N1 and let N2 be the resulting network state of applying R1 on
N1. Assume that R2 is feasible at N2. If psender is Byzantine or a transient fault causes the last
configuration of R1 to be the same as the first configuration of R2, then we can concatenate R1
and R2 and receive a new run R = [c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(1)
n , c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] feasible at N1.
Proof. If psender is Byzantine it can change its internal state whenever it wants, alternatively, by
using a transient fault we can also change the internal state of psender whenever we want. Let’s
look at R1 and assume that when we reach configuration c
(1)
n , psender changes its internal state
to be the same as in c(2)1 (could be because psender is Byzantine or because a transient fault
happened). Let’s call this new configuration c(1)fake and let’s call this new run Rfake. Notice that we
25
assumed that c(1)n and c
(2)
1 are different only in the internal state of psender, so we can conclude
that c(1)fake = c
(2)
1 . We assumed that R2 is feasible at N2. In Rfake we only changed the internal
state of psender, this step does not change the network state, so the resulting network state of
applying Rfake on N1 is also N2. Now we can concatenate Rfake and R2 and receive a new run
R = [c
(1)
1 , s
(1)
1 , ..., c
(1)
n , c
(2)
1 , s
(2)
1 , ..., c
(2)
n ] feasible at N1.
Figure 5: In C1 each honest party delivers
only m1
Figure 6: In C3 each honest party delivers
m2 more times than it delivers m1 consecu-
tively before
Lemma 6. [repeated] Assume that the input stream given to psender is a steam of a single mes-
sage repeated forever. Let PR be a protocol that satisfies the conditions of the SuRB problem and
resistant to one Byzantine party. For each party p′ ∈ P , p′ 6= psender, and for each System State
S = (C,N) there is a run R that starts from C and is feasible at N such that p′ takes no steps in
R and each honest party delivers an infinite incremental sequence. Also, the only party that might
change its internal state illegally in R (because of transient fault or maliciousness) is psender.
Proof. Let S = (C,N) be an arbitrary System State and p′ be a party that is not psender. By
Lemma 4, there is a run, R1, that starts from C and is feasible at N such that p′ takes no steps in
R and each honest party delivers an infinite number of messages. Let’s look at the sequence of
configurations and network states obtained by applying R1 on N . By condition S2 of SuRB, each
honest party must have a suffix of the delivered messages that contains only the message given
to psender via the input stream. Assume that psender is honest and the messages given to him via
the input stream is m0. Eventually we will reach a System State S1 = (C1, N1) such that in S1,
each honest party already performed deliver m0 and from S1 the only message that each honest
party will deliver is m0, also each honest party will deliver m0 infinitely many times. Now we can
stop R1 in configuration C1 and receive R1−sep (see Figure 5).
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Figure 7: In C4 each honest party delivers m1 more times than it delivers m2 consecutively before
Let C1−fake be the configuration that is different from C1 only in the internal state of psender, Let
S1−fake = (C1−fake, N1). Assume that in C1−fake each time psender reads from the input stream a
transient fault causes the message read to change inside psender memory to m1 (just like psender
actually reads m1 instead of m0). Let’s start from S1−fake. We know that there is a run, R2, that
starts from C1−fake and is feasible at N1 such that p′ takes no steps in R2 and each honest party
delivers an infinite number of messages (Lemma 4), also there is a suffix of delivered messages
that contains only the input of psender (condition S2). Eventually we will reach a System State
S2 = (C2, N2) such that from S2 the only message that each honest party will deliver is m1 and
each honest party will deliver m1 infinitely many times. Because each honest party will deliver
m1 infinitely many times, eventually we will reach a System State in which each honest party
delivered m1 more times than it delivered m0 consecutively before. Let’s call this System State
S3 = (C3, N3). Now we can stop R2 in configuration C3 and receive R2−sep (see Figure 6).
We can repeat the process from C3 and receive a new System State S3−fake = (C3−fake, N3)
and a run R3 that starts in C3−fake and is feasible at N3 such that each honest party will have a
suffix of delivered messages that contain only m0 (we assume that in C3−fake, psender reads the
real value, m0), also there must be a System State S4 in which each honest party already delivered
m0 more times than it delivered m1 consecutively before. Again we can obtain R3−sep in the same
way (see Figure 7).
We can repeat the process over and over again and receive an infinite sequence of runs such
that when applying Ri−sep on Ni, each honest party delivered mj consecutively more times than
it delivered m1−j consecutively before (j ∈ {1, 2}). Also for each i > 0 the last configuration in
Ri−sep and the first configuration in Ri+1−sep are different only in the internal state of psender and
their network state are the same so by Lemma 5 we can concatenate all those runs (by using
transient faults or maliciousness of the sender) and receive a run, Rfinal, feasible at N such that
p′ takes no steps in Rfinal and when applying Rfinal on N each honest party delivers an infinite
incremental sequence.
27
